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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

Office of the Commander

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

20 September 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, USCIB Special Committee

SUBJECT: COMINT Security Standards and Practices
of the Department of the Air Force

REFERENCE: Memo from Chairman, Special Committee,
dated 18 Aug 55, Subject: Announcement of
Initial Meeting, and verbal instructions from
the Chairman at Meeting of 7 Sep 55

This memorandum supersedes the memorandum submitted to the
Chairman of the USCIB Special Committee on 7 September 1955.

1. Pre-access checking and background investigating procedures:

a. Within Headquarters, USAF, as well as all Major Air Commands, other than USAF Security Service, the number of authorized recipients of COMINT is controlled by the Director of Intelligence. The Tables of Distribution for each command show the positions which require access to COMINT information. Prior to the establishment of a new position, the "need to know" must be fully justified. Whenever an individual is to be assigned to a position requiring access to COMINT, a request for clearance is submitted to the Director of Intelligence stating the position to which he is to be assigned. Such request is accompanied by necessary forms required by the Office of Special Investigations, such as Personal History Statement, History of Military Service, and Fingerprint Card. Upon receipt of such request for clearance, a check is made of all files in the Washington area to determine if there is any derogatory information on the individual. This is the National Agency Check, and is the preliminary step in the clearance procedures. The next step is to obtain a complete background investigation from the Office of Special Investigations, and no final clearance is granted until this file has been thoroughly reviewed by the Director of Intelligence. In addition, the citizenship status of the individual, the spouse, and the parents are ascertained. The individual must be a

USAF Declassification/Release Instructions On File

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native-born citizen and the spouse and the parents must be citizens. In a few cases waivers have been granted where other relatives are citizens of friendly countries.

b. All individuals assigned or attached for duty with USAF Security Service are given a complete background investigation, whether or not they are to be given access to COMINT information. The eligibility for a clearance for all personnel assigned to the Command is established at the Headquarters. The determination of what Z.I. positions require COMINT information is made by the major staff offices concerned, while for overseas positions this determination is made by the Security Service Wing and separate Group Commanders.

c. A complete background investigation as conducted for the Air Force consists of the following:

- (1) Check of national agencies, including the FBI Identification file and criminal files.
- (2) A check of education to include at least High School.
- (3) A check of employment since 1 January 1937 or the individual's 18th birthday.
- (4) Interviews with at least five references who are not relatives or former employers.
- (5) A check of the local Police Departments, where the individual has worked or resided. (This is in addition to the check of National Agency Records.)
- (6) Review of the individual's military records.
- (7) Check of the citizenship status of the individual and his immediate family. (This also includes, where applicable, a check of persons to whom he may reasonably be supposed to be bound by ties of affection, kinship, or obligation.)
- (8) A check of the individual's foreign travel and foreign connections.

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- (9) Neighborhood check only when information developed indicates that such an investigation should be made.
- (10) A check of the credit record of the individual from 1 January 1937 or his 18th birthday.
- (11) A check of all organizations to which the individual belongs, or has belonged in the past.

d. A re-investigation of individuals cleared for COMINT is not conducted within the Air Force on a periodic basis. However, additional investigations of individuals are made whenever information received by the unit commander indicates a need for such action. Special files are maintained by each Air Force unit in which all allegations or derogatory information on individuals assigned to the unit are recorded. Headquarters USAF Security Service maintains special files on all individuals assigned to that Command. Whenever the information in this special file indicates that a more extensive investigation is necessary, the information is forwarded to the Office of Special Investigations with a request for a complete investigation. Periodic re-investigation of all Air Force personnel engaged in COMINT activities is presently beyond the capability of this agency.

2. Methods of supervision, control, security education and inspection of COMINT personnel:

a. COMINT information is kept within designated areas throughout the Air Force. In the case of units other than USAF Security Service, the areas are secure rooms under the control of special security officers assigned to USAF Security Service. Within USAF Security Service, this material is confined to designated operational areas. In all cases, access to these areas is restricted to authorized personnel who have been properly identified. If an individual is not assigned to a particular area to which he requires access, his clearance must be furnished to the officer in charge of the area before he can be admitted. COMINT material is not allowed outside of these designated areas except when transferred for necessary action by official officer couriers. Visiting personnel must be properly identified, and, in addition, separate correspondence must have been sent through COMINT channels indicating their clearance

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status. Complete up-to-date lists of individuals authorized access to COMINT are maintained in the Special Security Office, Headquarters USAF, for all personnel in the Air Force, including officers and civilians assigned to USAF Security Service. The Headquarters of the latter maintains complete information on all personnel assigned or attached to the Command and, in addition, the units to which the individuals are assigned maintain a record on their own personnel.

b. A security educational program for COMINT personnel is conducted in three phases:

- (1) The first phase is an initial security indoctrination course which comprises six hours of instruction and testing. This course is attended by new assignees and covers the following subjects:
 - (a) Safeguarding official military information (AFR 205-1 and 205-2).
 - (b) Nicknames and Codewords (AFR 205-25).

Records of attendance are kept and tests are conducted upon completion of this course.

- (2) The second phase is a one-hour Security Training period conducted for all personnel each month. The material is contained in a training kit, and consists of:
 - (a) Security Regulations, Guides, Handbooks, etc.
 - (b) Security lectures.
 - (c) Examples of violations and methods for correction.
 - (d) Discussions on Communism.
 - (e) Folders, posters, handouts, etc.

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Each monthly kit also contains a report which is completed by the Unit Security Training Officer. In addition to its being a record of attendance, the report shows the method and manner of presentation. Annually a survey is made agency-wide whereby one out of every five persons volunteer information as to the value of the training program. Monthly unit reports and the annual survey provide an opportunity to improve the program. These two hundred and sixty Unit Training Officers throughout the COMINT agency maintain and insure continuity of this program.

- (3) The third phase of the security training program is an annual re-orientation course. All personnel are required to attend a meeting conducted by their Unit Security Officer once a year. A lecture is presented which is designed to bring individuals up to date on changes in security directives that have taken place during the preceding 12 months.

3. Means by which the potential damage a faulty employee could do can be minimized:

- a. The best method for minimizing any potential damage due to a faulty employee is to enforce a strict "need to know" principle, and to prohibit access to material that is not required in the performance of official duties, regardless of his or her clearance status. Since the majority of individuals in the COMINT field handle only one small facet of the problem, the numbers that require a more comprehensive picture are quite limited. Compartmentation of sensitive COMINT information within this group would, to a great extent, minimize any damage caused by the disaffection of one individual.

4. Conclusions as to the adequacy and/or inadequacy of USCIB personnel security standards and practices:

- a. The present USCIB Directive governing the Personnel Security Standards and Practices is basically adequate, except for the stated requirement of "periodic re-investigations" in paragraph 6. In the first place, it is doubted that the investigative service available to the Air

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Force will ever be manned to conduct re-investigations of all Security Service personnel, let alone all Air Force personnel engaged in COMINT. Further, we do not believe that a National Agency Check and a review of up-to-date Personal History Statements, in themselves, would constitute an adequate re-investigation. It is felt that this type of re-investigation would not reveal a deliberate security violator unless, perhaps, the review of the Personal History Statement was accomplished during an interview with the incumbent, conducted by trained and experienced psychologists or, better yet, by the use of an electropolygraph.

(1) A National Agency Re-check is desirable in the case of civilians, as it will, in all probability, reveal derogatory information not available elsewhere. However, in the case of military personnel, any action on their part which would result in an entry in the files of a National agency would have been reported to the individual's unit commander even before it would have been entered in such files.

(2) New Personal History Statements made by individuals would be of little value unless they were verified through an investigation or interview.

b. In addition to the two steps above, which are now considered the minimum requirement for a reopened investigation, there should be included a neighborhood check and a personal interview. The latter should be conducted by trained psychologists, and preferably with the aid of the electropolygraph.

c. Mandatory periodic re-investigations might well be limited to those personnel who have access to Category III COMINT. This would insure a thorough re-check of persons who could do the most damage if they were found to be disloyal.

5. It is recommended that:

a. A re-investigation at intervals not to exceed a period of five years be required in the case of all personnel having access to Category III COMINT, and that re-investigations in the case of all other COMINT personnel be made at the discretion of the member agency.


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b. The minimum requirement for re-investigation of civilian personnel be a National Agency Check, a neighborhood investigation, and an interview. The latter should be conducted with the electro-polygraph if available, but certainly by trained psychologists.

c. The minimum requirement for re-investigation of military personnel be the same as for civilians, except that the National Agency Check should be made only when specifically required by the member agency.


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